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Abstract: The end of the Cold War led to a seismic change in the political and security 
milieux. Within this changing context, small states were perceived as being weak and 
vulnerable since they are ‘powers which lack the resources and ability to maintain an 
independent international role’. This study seeks to analyse Malta’s role in this changing 
security milieu following the end of the Cold War. As a small-island state on the periphery 
of the European continent, Malta participates in the initiatives which help to address the 
geopolitical realities of the Mediterranean. The use of Malta as a case-study presents 
a more nuanced view of the role of small states within the context of the new security 
milieu. It portrays two different viewpoints: that of a small-island state within a changing 
security scenario and that of a quintessentially Mediterranean state. This qualitative 
analytical study utilizes a number of primary sources (contemporary newspaper articles, 
interviews, and leaked diplomatic cables) as well as a selection of secondary sources to 
investigate Malta’s role in the provision of security within the Mediterranean area.
Keywords: Small states, islands, European Union, Malta, foreign policy, security policy, 
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The end of the Cold War led to a seismic change in the global political and security milieux. The United States consolidated its hegemony; a ‘new world order’ dominated by increased 
globalization and established international institutions such as the 
United Nations and the World Bank seemed to beckon. 
In Eastern Europe, the socialist regimes governing Soviet 
satellite states disintegrated. Germany re-unified, the Iron Curtain 
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was dismantled, and relations between Moscow and Washington 
normalized. The march towards further European integration 
following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 seemed 
unstoppable. These developments altered the political dynamic.
The ensuing optimism was dampened by the realization that 
‘threats to Western security are going to emanate from different 
quarters’. Farley questioned whether the Mediterranean would 
become a ‘southern threat for northern shores’. The growing 
popular demand for defence budget cuts, in light of the new 
perceived ‘peace’, was met with fear from governments who 
were worried about ‘the strategic and economic repercussions if 
this mood was allowed to have its head’. Farley identified other 
threats emanating from the emerging North-South conflict:
Population expansion on the southern shores … brings with it concomitant pressures 
for migration ... those who can, emigrate to northern Mediterranean countries to seek 
work ... The arrival of so many people of different colour and culture in these various 
countries sets up suspicions, fear and resentment amongst the indigenous populations 
to a considerable degree.1
Terrorist movements claiming Islamic identity also strengthened 
their presence. Such movements gained ground in countries where ‘the 
promises of prosperity post-independence have remained unfulfilled’.2 
The security milieu was radically altered following the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attacks. 
Other security issues related to international crime intensified. 
These include drug trafficking, human trafficking, money 
laundering, and piracy. The new security scenario is less concerned 
with direct military threats by states; new security concerns are 
shaped by non-state actors. The pervasive nature of security risks 
means that states must also adopt measures to ensure that threats 
are minimized. 
In this context, small states are viewed as being vulnerable. 
They are often referred to as ‘weak states’ since they are ‘powers 
1 J. Farley, ‘The Mediterranean – Southern Threats to Northern Shores’, The World Today, 
Vol. 50, No. 2 (1994), 33–6.
2 Ibid.
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which lack the resources and ability to maintain an independent 
international role.’ Rothstein believes small states recognize that 
they cannot obtain security primarily by the use of their own 
capability. This view is also shared by Bartmann who argues that 
‘Small states lack the military capabilities to counter a security 
threat.’3
The Case of Malta
Malta brings to the discussion table two interesting perspectives: that 
of a small-island state within a changing security scenario and that of a 
quintessentially Mediterranean maritime state on the periphery of two 
great continents, Africa and Europe.
It became a member-state of the European Union (EU) on 1 May 
2004 together with nine other countries. Malta was now the smallest 
and southernmost member-state as well as a border-state and point of 
entry into the EU. This new reality itself obliged Malta to take on a new 
role within the region and within the institutions of the EU. 
This study examines Malta’s role in the first years following EU 
membership. The issues examined include the security challenges 
Malta faces but exclude the Libyan Civil War since the latter merits a 
study and a consideration of its own. The study presents a nuanced view 
of the role of small-island states within the context of the new security 
milieu. It reveals that Malta was neither a passive participant nor a main 
player but rather a cautious partner. 
EU Membership and the Mediterranean Dimension
Malta’s membership in the EU was preceded by a decade-long debate 
on whether this would be compatible with the constitutionally-
entrenched Neutrality status. A declaration confirming this status was 
attached to the Treaty of Accession; Article 17 of the EU Treaty states 
3 C. Ingebritsen, I. Neumann, S. Gstohl, J. Beyer (Eds.), Small States in International Rela-
tions (Washington, 2006) and G. Baldacchino (ed.), A World of Islands: an island studies 
reader (University of Prince Edward Island, 2007).
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that any move towards a common defence policy should respect the 
constitutional requirements of each member country.
The then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr Joe Borg, said that the 
prime reason for seeking to be part of the EU was determined by Malta’s 
geopolitics and size: ‘if anything goes wrong in the area surrounding 
us we might be among the first to feel the repercussions because of 
our size and limitations. We are limited by the extent to which we can 
protect ourselves.’4 
This standpoint is consistent with how a small-island state views 
itself. Owing to the vulnerability and limitations of size and geography, 
most states feel their security is best protected if they are part of a larger 
political group or alliance. Malta’s membership in the EU was well 
received in other states and it lead to closer cooperation with other 
member states. The principle of sovereign equality – that the vote of 
each country has an equal weighting in an international setting – makes 
Malta an attractive partner for regional and global cooperation. This 
view is shared by most diplomats posted to Malta.5
Nonetheless, this development has not always been viewed 
favourably. The former Prime Minister, Dr Alfred Sant argued that ‘by 
belonging to the EU, Malta would have to introduce (as it did) pan-
European policies that would create political, economic, and diplomatic 
distance between Malta and its southern neighbours’.6 
On the latter point, political and economic differences between 
Europe and North Africa are more pronounced and ‘perceptual and 
tangible gaps have continued to increase’. Therefore ‘if geo-strategic 
stability between Europe and the Mediterranean is to be achieved 
a more concerted effort must be implemented with a focus on the 
Mediterranean’.7
In this regard, Malta was one of the 27 countries to participate in the 
1995 Euro-Med conference in Barcelona and supported the establishment 
of the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008. Malta is also an active 
participant in the 5+5 Western Mediterranean Defence Initiative. The 
4 J. Borg, ‘Interview’ in A.P. DeBattista, ‘The Role of Small Island States and Jurisdictions 
in Reinforcing Global and Regional Security, Unpublished MA dissertation presented to the 
University of Malta, 2012, 311–17. 
5 DeBattista.
6 A. Sant, ‘Remarks’ in DeBattista, 365 –68.
7 S. Calleya, Mediterranean Perspectives on International Relations (Malta, 2009), 15.
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initiative involves ten countries located around the West Mediterranean 
and it ‘aims to establish a propitious frame for dialogue and cooperation’.8
Search and Rescue
Small-island states are often responsible for large areas of territorial 
waters which translates to additional responsibilities in terms of 
patrolling the seas and effecting search-and-rescue missions. Malta’s 
Search-and-Rescue (SAR) area is estimated to be the size of Great 
Britain covering an area extending from Tunis to Crete. Within this 
area, Malta is tasked with coordinating the rescuing of migrant boats 
as well as seafarers on commercial vessels, private yachts, and cruise 
liners.9 
Owing to limited resources, the Armed Forces of Malta (AFM) must 
fulfil various roles. The former Director of Defence Vanessa Frazier 
stated that the AFM’s major international obligations mainly concern 
search and rescue.10 Maltese vessels and aircraft are on constant patrol 
and were previously assisted by the Missione Italiana d’Assistenza 
Tecnico-Militare (the Italian Military Mission) which used to finance 
two helicopters and an Italian pilot.11 Since 2014, the AFM has been 
investing in its own equipment and it currently operates three Augusta 
Westland helicopters and two King Airs which ensure an effective 
monitoring of the SAR. The Italian Military Mission was affected by 
the 2015 Italian defence budgets cuts and by 2017 its presence will be 
limited to two officers from the Italian Navy and the Italian Air Force.
The SAR puts a strain on Maltese resources and international 
assistance is often required. Small-island states will, to a certain degree, 
always remain dependent on some form of assistance.
Assistance helps to indirectly strengthen regional security and serves 
as a gesture of good will. In 2008 the AFM had ‘urgent requirement 
to acquire modern helicopters capable of safely operating over water 
at long distances from its shores for Counter-Terrorism, Counter-
Narcotics, Border Control, and Maritime Law Enforcement missions’. 
8 MEDEA Institute, http://www.medea.be  (accessed 03.VI.2016).
9 V. Frazier, ‘Interview’ in DeBattista, 321–31   .
10 Ibid.
11 G. La Cognata, ‘Interview’ in DeBattista, 346–51.
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The US was in favour of such assistance claiming that ‘the provision of 
these aircraft to the AFM will have a long-lasting impact on US-Maltese 
relations’. Moreover, ‘it will allow the AFM to be more effective in 
applying the military-to-military training that the US has provided in 
the past.  In particular, it will allow them to provide better coverage 
within their assigned search-and-rescue region’.12
Malta still finds itself in a situation where its capacity is questioned 
by neighbouring countries. In 2009 Italy and Malta could not reach an 
agreement over who was responsible for the rescue of 140 immigrants 
at sea. The media reported that Italy was applying direct and indirect 
pressure to reduce the size of Malta’s SAR. Malta was being told that 
the SAR was ‘hindering the country’s ability to handle the illegal 
immigration problem effectively’.13
The Ministry for Home Affairs denied this and considered the large 
SAR to be to Malta’s advantage since a reduction in its size could lead 
to a reduction in revenue. The Sunday Times quoted some sources 
which claimed that the real reasoning behind Italy’s request was linked 
to the benefits ‘from funding for the Italian Guardia Costiera, to fishing 
zones, and even oil exploration’.14 
The foregoing case suggests that small-island states are still subject 
to direct and indirect international pressure and are still dependant on 
some form of assistance.  Membership in regional blocs such as the EU 
could be an attempt to counteract this dependency. 
EU Institutions and Malta’s role as a Border State
Malta participates in a number of EU initiatives. They include the 
EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Malta is an active participant in the CFSP. It takes part in ‘election 
observation missions organized by the European Union and other 
international organizations’ and promotes ‘dialogue between the 
EU and the Arab League through concrete initiatives’.15 Malta’s 
12 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA107.
13 The Sunday Times, 26.IV.2009.
14 Ibid.
15 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, http://foreignaffairs.gov.mt/ (accessed 04.VI.2016).
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constitutional neutrality may enhance the role it plays within the CFSP. 
Petersen argues that neutral countries can impact the CFSP positively 
by ‘making the policy less aggressive and more acceptable to the 
international community’.16
Malta also hosts the European Asylum Support Office. It staunchly 
supported the setting up of this office ‘in order to focus EU attention 
on the significant pressure that Malta faces with the asylum seekers’.17 
The organization was established in 2010 in order to ‘strengthen EU 
countries’ practical cooperation on asylum, to support EU countries 
whose asylum and reception systems are under particular pressure’.18 
As a point-of-entry into the EU, any person crossing this border 
can move freely throughout the Union. Dr Joe Borg recalls that this 
was a point which had to be dealt with in minute detail prior to EU 
membership: ‘There was always the fear that with a weak link in any 
part of the Union, and with the opening of borders for movement of 
persons, people would seek to enter from that point.’19
Malta is also a member of the Schengen Area. Arrest warrants issued 
in any European country are now enforceable throughout the EU. 
Such initiatives help small states engage in multilateral cooperation 
and may help to prevent states from turning into the afore-mentioned 
weak links.
Malta receives EU funds in order to strengthen its maritime border. 
These funds include the External Borders Fund (EBF) which allowed 
the Maltese Government to better equip the AMF and the Police Force. 
The EBF is part of the ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration 
Flows’ programme and has the function of helping to support ‘the 
protection of EU external borders … as well as smooth movement of 
legal travellers at the borders’.20 
The US has also expressed an interest in Malta’s border role and 
has provided considerable assistance which was aimed to ‘directly 
translate to the ability to more effectively identify and interdict sea 
16 K.K. Petersen, ‘Neutrality: a Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Conflict Resolu-
tion: The Future of European (and Global?) Security’, EUSA 8th Biennial International Con-
ference (Nashville, 2003).
17 Wikileaks.org – 09VALLETTA113.
18 European Law Online, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ (accessed 03.IV.2016).
19 Borg.
20 Ministry for Home Affairs and National Security, http://homeaffairs.gov.mt/ (accessed 
22.V.2016).
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borne traffic involved in Counter-Trafficking as well as Counter-
Terror and Counter-Proliferation operations and help Malta to address 
its number one security issue – Illegal Migration’.21 
Illegal Migration
According to the UNHCR, over 1,000,000 migrants crossed the 
Mediterranean in 2015.22 This humanitarian crisis poses new policy 
challenges of a social and institutional nature which include an 
‘overburdened social welfare system, rising crime rates and even 
international terrorism’.23
The ongoing lawlessness in Libya, the conflict in Syria, the rise 
of terrorism inspired by Islam, tension in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
failed states in the Horn of Africa are placing additional pressures on 
migration patterns to the point where a number of countries in Europe 
have declared a state of emergency.
An estimated 17,743 migrants landed in Malta between 2003 and 
2013. The sheer numbers constitute a security problem; relative to 
population size, this equates to around 2.5 million immigrants arriving 
in France or the UK.24 Malta’s size further exacerbates the problem 
since, at 1,265 persons per km2, Malta is one of the most densely 
populated countries in the world. Immigration also posits a security 
concern owing to the unknown provenance of some migrants. Such 
fears have intensified following the Paris terrorist attacks in November 
2015 and the Brussels terrorist attacks in March 2016.
This phenomenon exerts logistical pressures on Malta’s security 
structure. In the report on ‘Managing the Challenges of Illegal Immigration 
in Malta’, Calleya and Lutterbeck state that the lack of resources also 
poses a humanitarian problem: ‘the challenge in this regard is not only 
to deter irregular migration, but also to prevent the loss of life at sea’.25
21 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA107.
22 UNHCR, http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php (accessed 08.VI.2016).
23 D. Lutterbeck, ‘Irregular Migration and Immigration Control in the Mediterranean’, in Med-
iterranean Perspectives on International Relations, ed. S. Calleya (Malta, 2009) 61.
24 The Daily Telegraph, 21.VII.2013.
25 S. Calleya, D. Lutterbeck, Managing the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in Malta 
(Malta, 2008), 7.
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In order to deter migrants, Malta is the only EU state with an 
automatic policy of detention which applies irrespective of whether 
migrants seek asylum or not. The policy dictates that arriving migrants 
are detained for up to 18 months and are then released to an open centre 
if their asylum claim has been approved.26
The EU’s Dublin Convention places Malta and Cyprus in a 
‘disadvantageous situation’ since ‘it imposes a disproportionate burden 
on small countries which happen to be located at the EU’s external 
borders. Moreover, in Malta’s case, unlike virtually every other country 
in Europe, there is no ‘hinterland’ to which they can move’. The EU 
Commission’s Green Paper on the Common European Asylum System 
acknowledged the challenges faced by border-states such as Malta 
and Cyprus but stopped short of advocating a revision of the Dublin 
Convention. It suggested the introduction of ‘corrective burden-sharing 
mechanisms … for countries with limited reception capacities which 
are facing particular migratory pressure because of their geographical 
location’. This was enshrined in the European Pact on Immigration and 
Asylum which includes a mechanism on voluntary burden-sharing.27 
Malta was one of the countries which argued vociferously for the 
principle of burden-sharing to be included in this pact.28
A person whose request for asylum has been rejected must be returned 
to the country of origin. Consular officials may have to be brought to 
Malta to ascertain the identity of the individuals and provide them 
with a passport. In other cases, the failed applicants cannot be returned 
home because their personal safety cannot be ascertained. In the case 
of Somali migrants, negotiating repatriation is problematic. Given that 
Somalia is a failed state, Malta cannot negotiate a return since there 
is no state apparatus with which to reach a plausible agreement. As 
a result, Malta has negotiated ‘several resettlement programmes with 
different countries that are willing to take on migrants who cannot be 
returned to their country of origin’.29 The US has been a reliable partner 
in this regard.
Malta initially supported the European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States 
26 Wikileaks.org – 09VALLETTA169.
27 Calleya and Lutterbeck, 5–6.
28 Wikileaks.org – 09VALLETTA169.
29 Frazier.
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of the European Union (FRONTEX). FRONTEX began operations in 
the Mediterranean to try and halt the arrival of asylum seekers and ‘to 
coordinate the activities of the border control forces of the EU member 
countries, which continue to bear the main responsibility for controlling 
their frontiers’. FRONTEX has been assigned a budget and its own 
staff; however, it lacks its own assets and operative personnel and is 
thus dependent on the resources of several EU countries.30 
A representative from the Italian embassy in Malta stated that 
FRONTEX is only ‘one of the instruments’ at the disposal of policy 
makers and that one must ‘go to the root of the problem’.31 This suggestion 
has been echoed in the Calleya and Lutterbeck report which highlights 
that ‘irregular migration to Europe will only be reduced if Africa is able 
to employ its population and to offer them a more decent living’.32
Immigration highlights Malta’s apparent vulnerability; its size, 
population density, and lack of human resources make it difficult for 
the small-island state to deal with this challenge without any external 
help. In international fora Malta has been an effective spokesman 
in highlighting the vulnerability of small-island states to changing 
migratory patterns. 
Nonetheless, immigration is a problem which is not likely to 
subside and Malta must engage both with area players and with out-
of-area players, such as the US, who have a security interest in the 
Mediterranean.
The Neutrality Clause
The commissioning of repairs on the flagship for the commander of the 
US Sixth Fleet USS La Salle in 2001 provoked an intense debate over 
whether such work breached the Neutrality clause in the Constitution 
which states that: ‘the shipyards of the Republic of Malta will be used 
for civil commercial purposes, but may also be used, within reasonable 
limits of time and quantity, for the repair of military vessels which have 
been put in a state of non-combat or for the construction of vessels 
30 Lutterbeck, 69–70.
31 La Cognata.
32 Calleya and Lutterbeck, 9.
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… the said shipyards will be denied to the military vessels of the two 
superpowers’.33
The Labour Opposition claimed that these repairs went against ‘the 
spirit and the letter of the Constitution.’ The then Minister for Economic 
Services, Prof. Josef Bonnici, dismissed such claims stating that ‘It 
would be a big mistake for the country to cling to expired policies 
that had been introduced decades ago and which had come to an end 
with the historic superpower summit in Malta that had ended the Cold 
War.’34 Bonnici believed that the ‘neutrality clause was linked to non-
alignment between the superpowers’ and it was wrong to equate the 
former USSR with Russia.35
Prime Minister Dr Eddie Fenech Adami intervened by threatening 
‘yard workers with stopping government subsidies if the work was not 
taken in hand’. The yard workers relented and the relevant works on the 
USS La Salle were carried out and the vessel visited the island again for 
a second refit in 2003.36
The debate over the relevance of neutrality never abated. US 
ambassadors to Malta were somewhat vocal on this constitutional 
provision. In an article in The Sunday Times, a former US ambassador, 
Prof. Douglas Kmiec, wrote that ‘no modern nation can remain neutral 
in the face of extraordinary threat to the civil order’. Kmiec expressed 
concern at the possibility of Malta being used as a springboard by 
terrorists owing to its constitutional neutrality.37
Whilst the original neutrality clause gave Malta the possibility to 
opt out of any confrontation between the two superpowers, the new 
security threats did not offer the same option. In reaction to Kmiec's 
comments, the former Foreign Minister Dr Michael Frendo stated 
that the neutrality clause has nothing to do with Malta’s approach to 
terrorism for ‘it never wavered in its stance.’ Although he acknowledges 
that Malta’s neutrality should be reviewed, he still attributed a role to 
this provision: ‘which essentially means not having military base in 
Malta, and not participating in any military alliance’38 
33 Constitution of Malta, Chapter 1, 3 (e).
34 The Times, 14.VII.2001.
35 Ibid., 13.II.2001.
36 Ibid., 12.VII.2003.
37 The Sunday Times, 3.I.2010.
38 MaltaToday, 06.I.2010.
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Malta’s relationship with NATO also re-ignited the debate on 
neutrality. Malta joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme 
in 1995. Its membership was suspended in 1996 following a change 
in administration. A Note Verbale presented to the General Secretariat 
of NATO stated: ‘Further participation by Malta in the Partnership for 
Peace Programme organized by NATO is considered to be incompatible 
with the Constitutional provisions that define Malta’s neutrality.’39
A US cable sent prior to the 2008 election disclosed that ‘The greatest 
impact of a Labour victory would be with regard to Malta’s willingness 
to support multi-lateral security efforts … Labour remains adamantly 
opposed ... Sant has also indicated he would like to see a reduction in 
the visits by US navy ships.’ 40
Following the 2008 election, Prime Minister Lawrence Gonzi 
reactivated Malta’s membership in NATO’s PfP programme. During 
the Bucharest Summit, ‘Prime Minister Gonzi asserted that with PfP 
membership Malta will be able to develop its military interoperability, 
force planning, modernize the armed forces, and participate in training 
exercises’. Malta’s membership in PfP rectified an anomaly in the Europe-
wide discussion on security: ‘As a non-NATO EU member, the Maltese 
are routinely asked to leave the room when NATO classified information 
is discussed during EU defence meetings, something that has been a 
source of embarrassment for the GOM (Government of Malta) since EU 
accession.’ The Malta Labour Party stated that neutrality was breached 
and hinted that Double Taxation Agreement was signed on condition 
that Malta reactivated its PfP membership. The US ambassador denied 
these accusations.41 Nonetheless, the US embassy provided Malta with 
‘support, guidance and communication throughout the process.’42
Regional cooperation and the participation in training programmes 
are important tools for small-island states. The risks faced in the 
Mediterranean necessitate such cooperation: ‘The Mediterranean is a 
very important passage from one side of the world to another … [we] 
have to be vigilant because of the type of vessels and the amount of 
traffic that passes through our waters.’43
39 Note Verbale, 1070/96.
40 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA44.
41 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA134.
42 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA135.
43 Frazier.
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The US Government provides assistance through the International 
Military Education and Training and International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement programmes in an attempt to try and prevent different forms 
of international crime.44 The necessity of international cooperation, 
the changing security milieu, together with the time-specific wording 
of the constitutional clause, should serve as an impetus to reappraise 
the constitutional definition of neutrality in a way which is relevant 
to current realities. Failure to do so may have the unintended effect of 
weakening both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution. 
International Organizations
Despite its size, Malta participates actively within various international 
fora. Participation in such fora allows small-island states to launch 
initiatives and to make their views heard on several issues. The United 
Nations is a platform which most small-states use to champion causes 
which directly affect them, such as the threat of climate change which 
threatens their very existence. Moreover, the principle of sovereign 
equality allows for equal votes for all UN members irrespective of their 
size or population. Malta’s participation in the UN dates to 1965. Since 
1988, it has raised various key issues including climate change, rising 
sea levels, and migration. 
Malta has also been an active member of the Commonwealth 
since 1964. The Commonwealth was instrumental in highlighting the 
vulnerability of small states and the need to put the problems such 
states face on the agenda. Malta chaired a number of Commonwealth 
committees and hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government 
Meetings in 2005 and 2015. 
Malta’s Proactive Role 
The ability for Malta, as a small-island state, to take on a more pro-
active role can be somewhat limited to activism within international 
institutions. Nonetheless, some active measures have been taken in 
order to enhance security.
44 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA96.
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In 2009 President Obama delivered a speech on ‘The Way Forward 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan’. The speech addressed the declining 
situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and tried to garner further support 
from different US partners. The US approached Malta in an attempt to 
shore up some support for President Obama’s proposal. Ambassador 
Kmiec ‘pointed out that a major element of the new strategy will be 
for civilian assistance in projects to eliminate corruption, to revitalize 
the economy, especially the agricultural sector, and to help rebuild 
civil society’.45 Malta’s response to this request was favourable. The 
Government provided training ‘on subjects such as public administration 
or law enforcement’ with the proviso that ‘it could not be military aid 
or training, and that it would have to take into account Malta’s limited 
resources’.46 
The AFM partnered the Dutch navy to train and serve in anti-piracy 
missions off the coast of Somalia. This partnership was essential since 
the AFM lacked the equipment needed for such operations. Nonetheless, 
Malta provided some expertise which the Dutch navy did not possess.47
Cooperation is essential in other areas. During the period under 
review, Malta was concerned at the attempts by Iranian banks to access 
the Euro Payment System. The Maltese ambassador in France was 
approached by Iran which expressed interest ‘in “investing several 
billion euros” in Malta’.’48
A US cable reports that the head of secretariat within the Ministry 
of Finance expressed concern that two Iranian banks wanted to use 
Malta’s payment system via London: ‘these were banks that did not 
have a branch licence in Malta … but were attempting to “access the 
payment system of our Central Bank”’.49 
During a short visit in Malta, the US Under-Secretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey warned that Iranian 
banks could be used to pursue activities related to the proliferation of 
weapons and terrorism. He explained that ‘through its state-owned 
banks, [Iran] employs deceptive techniques to evade the controls of 
responsible institutions … the banks that continue to do business with 
45 Wikileaks.org – 09VALLETTA525.
46 Wikileaks.org – 10VALLETTA54.
47 Frazier.
48 Wikileaks.org – 09VALLETTA75.
49 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA89.
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Iran bear a disproportionate risk of getting tied up in potentially illicit 
activity’.50
Malta’s EU membership necessitated the introduction of ‘EU-
compliant legislation for the prevention of money laundering and 
strong financial services legislation’. Prior to EU membership, Malta 
established the Financial Intelligence Analysis Unit in order to coordinate 
‘the fight against money laundering, collect information from financial 
institutions, and liaise with parallel international institutions as well as 
the MFSA (Malta Financial Services Authority) and the GOM Police’.51 
Trafficking in persons is another pressing concern. Human 
trafficking is the second largest source of global organized crime, 
generating approximately $31.6bn. In the period under review, Malta 
was not considered to be neither a destination nor a transit country for 
human trafficking. However, measures had to be adopted in order to 
avoid such a scenario.
The International Organization for Migration held training sessions 
in 2007 with ‘representatives from Maltese law enforcement and 
civil society’. It was ‘successful in identifying the interrelations of 
trafficking with irregular migration, analysing prevention, prosecution 
and protection, and developing possible avenues of cooperation at a 
national and international level amongst the diverse stakeholders 
and institutions’. A US embassy cable observed that ‘despite a lack 
of awareness at a national level, the increase in prosecutions in the 
Maltese courts suggests that law enforcement authorities are conducting 
investigations into the phenomenon’.52 
Trafficking claims are also investigated among the migrant 
population.53 The US also discussed such issues with the Minister for 
Justice and Home Affairs and noted that ‘the police actively investigate 
all cases of potential victims of trafficking and have a formalized system 
in place’.54 
Drug trafficking is considered to be the largest source of global 
organized crime. The Mediterranean is not considered to be a major 
drug route and the situation is believed to be under control. This is 
50 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA168.
51 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA479.
52 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA129.
53 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA303.
54 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA530.
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confirmed by a US embassy cable which stated that Malta ‘does not play 
a significant role in the transit, processing, or production of narcotics 
and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances’. On a bilateral 
level, Malta cooperates with states where such threats are believed to 
originate from: ‘In 2009, Malta and Uzbekistan signed an Agreement 
on Cooperation in the Fight against Organized Crime, Contraband, and 
Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs, Psychotropic Substances, and 
Precursors.’55
The risk that small-island states become potential hubs or transit 
countries for security threats looms in the minds of several decision-
makers. The US channels considerable assistance towards avoiding 
this. An embassy cable notes that ‘one-third of the world’s maritime 
traffic passes by or through Malta, with some 1.5 million containers 
passing through Malta’s Freeport each year’. The Freeport was the 
beneficiary of considerable US investment which includes the setting up 
of a ‘Maltese Customs presence in the Freeport ... [and] a $2.1 million 
VACIS-equipped (Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System) warehouse’.56,
Following UN Security Council Resolution 1803, Malta was obliged 
to monitor any Iranian cargo passing through the island. Malta was also 
bound to ‘inspect IRISL (Iranian Shipping Lines) cargoes whenever 
there were grounds to believe that the vessel might be transporting 
prohibited items under UNSCR 1803 or UNSCRs 1737 or 1747.  Given 
the extensive use that IRISL made of Malta’s Freeport, it was incumbent 
upon Malta to be exceedingly vigilant.’57
The Customs Department in Malta has been developed ‘into one of 
the top customs operations in Europe’ after receiving ‘US assistance 
and training’. Their vigilance and the equipment bought with US funds 
‘resulted in a 2006 “bust” of an operation to ship gyroscopes used in 
missile production to Iran, for which a suspect was recently indicted in 
the UK.’58
55 Wikileaks.org – 09VALLETTA490.
56 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA146.
57 Wikileaks.org – 08VALLETTA273.
58 Ibid..
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Conclusion
The events described in this study took place in a period where Malta 
had to assert itself as a sovereign nation within an interdependent 
structure – the European Union. They reflect an evolution in security 
concerns; from the East-West divide to the North-South divide; from 
defence-oriented concerns to human security issues. 
The issues discussed are heavily influenced by the debate on the 
relevance of neutrality and the evolving definition of neutrality. 
There is a consensus among Maltese policy-makers about the need to 
redefine the Neutrality clause in Article 1 of the Constitution. Changing 
circumstances give credence to this view and a rigid interpretation of 
neutrality could end up being counterproductive or damaging. Yet, a 
small-island state like Malta still attributes some value in retaining 
neutrality as a safeguard against undue influence or pressure from larger 
states or other regional actors. The US feared that Malta’s neutrality 
could make it more vulnerable to terrorist groups or prevent it from 
taking part in programmes which help safeguard regional and global 
security. This view was unfounded. A pragmatic approach to neutrality 
allays such fears. 
New security issues are not confined by borders. Nor are they 
solely directed against states and their apparata. The emergence of 
international and regional fora and the multilateral approach to security 
is a response to such realities. Within such fora, small-island states have 
found a voice and are contributing to the discussion and the provision 
of security on a regional and on a global level. These organizations 
are perceived to be the most effective tool for conflict resolution and 
confidence building. Thus Malta’s membership in the EU and its 
participation in other Mediterranean and international fora features 
prominently in the period under review.
Vulnerability is still an ever-present concern for small-island states 
and regional actors. Small-island states often view membership in 
political unions and security alliances as a form of ‘safety valve’ against 
any threats and a good source of funding and expertise. Some may fear 
a loss of influence; nonetheless Malta’s activism on several issues, 
including immigration and other the security of the Mediterranean have 
strengthened, rather than weakened, Malta’s voice. 
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Vulnerability manifests itself in a number of forms; islands may 
be limited by size and by geography. Moreover, the security apparatus 
of a small-island state is hindered by limited resources – both human 
and financial. There are several logistical pressures on the security 
infrastructure of a small-nation state thereby making it dependent on 
some form of external assistance. Notwithstanding these issues, the 
number of small-island states and the role they have played in the 
past means that they cannot be discounted or excluded when devising 
security strategies. Malta is not an exception to this.
